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PARDON FOR GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASONS
Kathleen Dean Moore*
To all to whom these presents shall come, greetings ....
Whereas it does not appear that the ends of justice require that
the [offender] serve the aforesaid sentence in its entirety;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT KNOWN, that I,.... the President
of the United States, in consideration of the premises, divers other
good and sufficient reasons me hereunto moving, do hereby com-
mute the aforesaid prison sentence ....
INTRODUCTION
The preamble to an executive grant of clemency from the Presi-
dent of the United States implies that pardons are granted on the
basis of "premises,... good and sufficient reasons." Yet, pardons
have not always been regarded as the sort of acts that need to be
justified by argument. In fact, most presidential pardons are issued
without any statement of justification beyond the assurance that
good reasons do exist. As a result, the issue of what constitutes
good and sufficient reasons for a presidential pardon is seldom ad-
dressed and still unresolved.
In this Essay, I presuppose that presidents should make pardon-
ing decisions on the basis of reasons and that those reasons should
be made public. I suggest that the only good and sufficient reason
for pardoning a felon is that justice is better served by pardoning
than by punishing in that particular case. It follows that some
kinds of reasons do not justify a pardon and so pardons granted on
those grounds constitute an abuse of the pardoning power. It also
follows that it is possible to specify in advance the general kinds of
cases that call for pardons.2
* Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Oregon State University.
B.A., 1969, College of Wooster; M.A., 1973, Ph.D., 1977, University of Colorado.
1. OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, WARRANTS OF PARDON: 1942-1987.
2. For a philosophical exposition of this argument, see KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS:
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989). For a legal exposition of a similar view,
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HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PARDONS
The history of pardoning in Anglo-American culture reveals both
the gradual development of the idea that pardons should be justi-
fied by reasons, and a rough moral progress in the kinds of justifi-
cations offered.
The pardoning power of the great monarchs of seventeenth and
eighteenth century Europe was analogous in theory and practice to
divine grace. Like grace, the freely given, unearned gift of divine
favor, a royal pardon was thought of as a personal gift. Therefore,
it required no justification and was not subject to criticism. As per-
sonal favors, acts of beneficence and benevolence, pardons were be-
yond the reach of both positive and moral law. Thus, pardons
could be granted for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all.
The monarchs used "gifts of grace" to reward their friends and
undermine their enemies, to populate their colonies, to man their
navies, to raise money and to quell rebellions.3 Unusual only in the
price he charged, James II sold pardons for 16,000 pounds sterling,
of which he received "one half and the other half was divided
among the two ladies then most in favour." 4
Fully aware of the abuses of the royal pardoning power, the
Framers of the United States Constitution nonetheless granted
analogous power to the president of the new republic. They ex-
pected that, unlike kings, presidents would pardon with "scrupu-
lousness and caution,"5 because a president who abused the power
would be answerable through the impeachment process. However,
the Framers provided no criteria for distinguishing between proper
and improper uses of the pardoning power and put no constitu-
tional limit on the president's use of that power, except to prohibit
pardons in cases of impeachment. In 1833, the United States Su-
preme Court defined a presidential pardon as a personal "act of
grace,"' 6 effectively confirming that presidential pardons fall into
the category of things needing no reasoned justification.
see Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power from
the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 569-641 (1991). See also JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. XIII (1976).
3. Kathleen D. Moore, Would Public Be Served by a Pardon for North?, L.A. TIMES, July
6, 1989, pt. II at 7.
4. C. HEWITT, THE QUEEN'S PARDON 20 (1978).
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 482-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Random House ed., 1937).
6. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
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Nevertheless, presidents often did explain their reasons for
granting a pardon. A systematic record of the reasons cited by
presidents between 1885 and 1931 shows that the most common
reason given for pardoning was doubt about the guilt of the ac-
cused or about the justice of the proceedings.7 For example, presi-
dents cited "grave doubt as to justice of conviction," "dying con-
fession of real murderer," "mental infirmity of judge," and
"mistaken identity."" A significant number of pardons, however,
were granted for reasons that are clearly unacceptable today. Some
of those reasons related to gender ("for the sole reason that the
applicant was a woman and in order to avoid the spectacle of a
woman being executed"9 ), powerful friends ("recommendation by
influential citizen"' 0), and family connections ("respectability of
prisoner's family""). All of these reasons provide unearned advan-
tage to some felons and unfairly disadvantage others based on fac-
tors beyond their control and irrelevant to the purposes of punish-
ment. Unjust as they are, these rationales were shielded from
criticism by the "legacy of the arbitrary exercise of clemency '12 -
the fact that it is conceptually incoherent to criticize a personal
gift.
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court gave up the "pre-
tense""3 that the pardoning power of a president is akin to the di-
vine or royal prerogative.' 4 In Biddle v. Perovich, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes spoke for the Court: "A pardon in our days is not
a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess
power,. . . [but rather] it is the determination of the ultimate au-
thority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment fixed."' 5 The Constitution does not
give the president power to pardon arbitrarily as a personal favor.
It does give him the power to make pardoning decisions based on
reasoned judgments.
7. W.H. HUMBERT, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT 124f (1941).
8. Id.
9. REPORTS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 1921-1941, at 691.
10. HUMBERT, supra note 7, at 124f.
11. Id.
12. Kobil, supra note 2, at 572.
13. In Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 90 (1915), the Supreme Court suggested that
"the grace of a pardon ... may be only in pretense ..
14. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
15. Id. at 486.
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Since then, in the unusual case of a controversial pardon,'16 presi-
dents have generally given public explanation of their reasons. For
example, to support his decision to pardon former President Rich-
ard Nixon, President Gerald Ford used reasons that carefully echo
Alexander Hamilton's discussion of justified pardons. Hamilton
wrote: "[T]here are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer
of pardon . . . may restore the tranquility of the common-
wealth . "... ,17 President Ford said: "[T]he tranquility to which
this nation has been restored by the events of recent weeks could
be irreparably lost by the prospects of bringing to trial a former
President of the United States."'18 Regardless of the questionable
wisdom of President Ford's decision, what is significant is that he
clearly recognized the need to argue for the validity of his decision
using historically recognized reasons.
Gradually shedding a view of pardons that was based on the di-
vine right of kings, the United States has reached a point where
pardoning decisions are expected to be justified by reasons. What
constitutes good and sufficient reasons, however, is not clear.
DEFINING GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASONS TO PARDON
Public debate about what makes a pardon appropriate is needed.
The United States Supreme Court has provided a place to start, a
standard against which presidential pardons can be measured: Is
the public welfare better served by pardoning than by punishing
this particular felon? 19
In my view, pardons best serve the public interest when they
serve justice. The judicial system is a complex system through
which general rules are applied to particular cases in contexts
marked by uncertainty. It is therefore particularly vulnerable to
error. The pardoning power is a backup system that works outside
of the rules to correct mistakes, making sure that only those who
deserve punishment are punished.
16. Usually a petitioner must wait five to seven years after sentence was served and then
meet a carefully defined set of standards before he or she can be considered for a presiden-
tial pardon. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 to 1.10 (1992). Very few of these petitions are granted and
reasons are seldom given.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 5, at 481.
18. Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974).
19. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
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Accordingly, a president abuses the pardoning power when he
makes decisions based only on self-interest or narrow partisan in-
terests, or when he is moved by pity or concern for the welfare of
the accused. A president uses the pardoning power properly when
he uses it to prevent or correct a potential injustice.
POOR AND INSUFFICIENT REASONS TO PARDON
By the standard set out in Biddle v. Perovich,20 pardons granted
- or not granted - solely as a means to advance the interests of
the president, his friends, or his party are a clear abuse of the par-
doning power.21 Montesquieu was wary of rulers who were moved
to grant pardons to win public support, "so many are the advan-
tages which monarchs gain by clemency, so greatly does it raise
their fame, and endear them to their subjects."22 Today, when the
presidential pardoning power is atrophying from lack of exercise,2 3
one might equally criticize presidents who refuse to pardon, when
their refusals are based on political calculations alone. Whether a
president decides to pardon too many people or too few, the presi-
dent who makes pardoning decisions based solely on self-regarding
purposes is abusing the pardoning power.
By the same standard, pardons granted solely out of pity, or
kindness, to prevent the "further punishment and degradation" of
an accused person,24 as President Gerald Ford said of former Presi-
dent Richard Nixon, are not based on sufficient reason. Because a
pardon singles someone out for special treatment, every pardon is
potentially a comparative injustice, a violation of the principle of
equal treatment under the law.25 Although a personal favor might
be justified on the principle that .a little kindness in better than
none, pardons are not personal favors; they are part of the "consti-
tutional scheme. '26
20. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
21. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
22. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. 6, ch. 21.
23. See the statistics in Kobil, supra note 2, at 640-41.
24. Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974).
25. See Kathleen D. Moore, When Mercy Weakens Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1989, at
A19, A23.
26. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). In the Reagan and Bush administrations,
the nation saw the worst of both worlds - a stunning decline in the overall number of
presidential pardons granted (from 91 in 1983 to zero in 1990), with exceptions made to
grant clemency to a few chosen friends (Marvin Mandel, Armand Hammer, and George
Steinbrenner).
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GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASONS TO PARDON
In my view, pardons should be used as part of a broader consti-
tutional scheme to ensure that sentences are assigned justly. The
criminal justice system is based on a limited set of fundamental
moral principles which are rooted in a retributivist tradition. This
tradition holds that it is wrong to punish a person who has com-
mitted no crime, that punishment must be in response to wrongdo-
ing, and that the severity of the punishment ought to be propor-
tional to the seriousness of the wrongdoing.17 Elaborate procedural
rules have been put into place in an effort to honor these principles
in practice.
A pardon is justified when the procedures miscarry, giving the
state a legal, but not a moral, license to punish. I believe Alexander
Hamilton had this in mind when he argued for a pardoning power
to provide "easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt,
[without which] justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary
and cruel."2" To prevent a legal punishment that violates any one
of these moral principles is, I suggest, good and sufficient reason to
pardon.
Good and sufficient reason to pardon exists when a person con-
victed of a crime may not have committed that crime. The clear-
est cases are those in which new evidence surfaces after sentencing,
giving some ground for believing that the wrong person was con-
victed. For example, to prevent an innocent person from being
punished President Franklin Roosevelt pardoned convicted ban-
krobber Martin Prisament on grounds that Prisament was "inno-
cent of the offense for which he is now being held. '30 On the same
basis, it may be possible to justify the type of presidential pardon
most frequently granted over the past thirty years - pardons
granted to felons who have served their time, turned their lives
around, and become, in effect, "new people." Craig Martin, for-
merly an armed robber, now a boy scout leader, argued that Presi-
27. Sidney Gendin, A Plausible Theory of Retribution, V J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 1 (1970).
28. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 5, at 482.
29. Perhaps the most famous example comes from Luke 23:13-25:
Pilate then called together the chief priests and the rulers and the people, and said to
them, "You brought me this man as one who was perverting the people; and after
examining him before you, behold, I did not find this man guilty of any of your
charges against him; neither did Herod, for he sent him back to us. Behold, nothing
deserving death has been done by him; I will therefore chastise him and release him."
30. Prisament v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 434, 434 (1941).
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dent Reagan "gave the pardon to a totally different person than
the one that existed a quarter-century ago. Granted I have the
same body, but it's a totally different mind."' 31 To the extent this
transformation is real, it is appropriate for a president to prevent a
transformed person from having to bear the continuing effects of
punishment for a crime committed by the person he or she no
longer is.
Good and sufficient reason exists to pardon a person who is
guilty under the law but is not morally blameworthy. If people are
to be punished only for their blameworthy acts, then acts that are
not blameworthy do not call for punishment. In ways that sentenc-
ing guideline cannot, a president can be sensitive to distinctions in
moral blameworthiness and can protect from punishment a person
who has done no wrong. Examples of such situations, are complex
and problematic, but may include pardons for crimes committed
out of necessity (such as Ohio Governor Celeste's pardon of
twenty-five women who killed or assaulted husbands who had sub-
jected them to continuous violent abuse), 32 pardons for crimes
committed because of coercion (such as Patricia Hearst Shaw's
continuing campaign for a pardon for crimes she committed while
under the influence of the Symbionese Liberation Army), or par-
dons for crimes committed in compliance with sincerely held moral
beliefs such as a presidential pardon granted to a Vietnam war era
draft evader who believed that "peace among human beings is of
the ultimate necessity").3
Good and sufficient reason to pardon exists when the sentence is
too harsh when measured against the seriousness of the offender's
wrongdoing. Questions about what punishment is deserved raise a
number of philosophical and legal issues, making a judgment of
"fitting" punishment difficult. In theory, however, it is appropriate
for a president to grant a pardon to prevent or mitigate the com-
parative injustice that occurs when one person's sentence is more
severe than that of another whose act was identical. For example,
in the wake of Governor Celeste's pardons of battered women in
Ohio, there are ongoing campaigns in the state of Washington to
win gubernatorial pardons for battered women who killed or as-
31. Ted Gup, For Seekers of Forgiveness at Lofty Levels, a Presidential Pardon, WASH.
POST, Apr. 17, 1987, at A21.
32. Women Granted State's Clemency, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 22, 1990, at 1A, cited in
Kobil, supra note 2, at 614.
33. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD REPORT 319 (1975).
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saulted their assailants. Pardons can also prevent the noncompara-
tive injustice that occurs when a sentence is too harsh. For exam-
ple, believing that forcing convicts to work on chain gangs was
cruel, Governor George W. Donaghey of Arkansas pardoned 396
prisoners in one day. 4 Finally, pardons can prevent punishments
from becoming too harsh, given the suffering that an offender has
already undergone.
CONCLUSION
Presidents should be called to account for their pardoning deci-
sions. A president is not a "fountain of nothing but bounty and
grace '3 5 whose pardons flow from "his own breast. 3 6 He is a public
official making a decision that is part of the constitutional scheme
of criminal justice.
34. Ernest Morris, Some Phases of the Pardoning Power, 12 A.B.A. J. 183, 189 (1926).
35. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 397.
36. Id. at 395.
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